International trade in wildlife is a major threat to biodiversity conservation. CITES, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, is the primary mechanism for maintaining sustainability in international wildlife trade. Although a comparatively well-designed legal instrument, CITES has been criticised because of its emphasis on regulatory measures and disregard for the economic reality of wildlife trade. Through means of a case study on the trade in pangolins (Pholidota: Manidae) in Asia, we evaluate the CITES approach to controlling trade and demonstrate significant areas to be addressed. These arise because CITES fails to accurately monitor supply, particularly where trade is illegal, it fails to consider the impact of trade controls in realistic terms, and it does little to consider the complex nature of demand or contend with changing market dynamics. To more effectively manage trade we argue that reforms are needed within CITES. Specifically, we highlight improved monitoring of supply (by accounting for illegal and legal trade) and of demand and prices for wildlife (through national wildlife consumption surveys). This information would generate a more holistic understanding of wildlife trade and, if integrated with the Convention's existing trade database, would allow a more realistic evaluation of the performance of trade controls, and could inform decision-making and the implementation of interventions which go beyond regulation and address demand directly. In a world of rapid economic and social change understanding markets and addressing demand as well as supply is essential to conserving the world's trade threatened species.
Introduction
International trade in wildlife is a major threat to biodiversity conservation (Broad et al., 2003; Sutherland et al., 2009) and can diminish species' populations, cause extirpations, and ultimately threaten ecosystem function Duckworth et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2010) . It is of serious concern to policymakers at present as a result of rising demand for traditional Asian medicine, luxury foods and curios, among other trades (e.g., pets), and current laws and regulations are increasingly being by-passed (Challender and MacMillan, 2014; Natusch and Lyons, 2012; Rosen and Smith, 2010) .
CITES, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, which entered into force in 1975, is the primary mechanism for controlling international wildlife trade (CITES, 2014a) . It seeks to ensure that international trade does not threaten the survival in the wild of c.35,000 species (CITES, 2014a) . It relies on precise and specific regulatory measures including trade bans (3% or 931 species are listed in Appendix I) and controls (96% or 34, 419 species are listed in Appendix II and < 1% or 147 species are listed in Appendix III), which are established following an assessment of species' extinction risk, and the subsequent monitoring of trade levels (CITES, 2014a; Wijnstekers, 2011) . It is implemented by member states (known as Parties, currently numbering 181) through a system of permits, national legislation and enforcement mechanisms, and nominated national agencies (CITES, 2014a) .
Although CITES has had successes in species conservation terms, it has also been criticised because it disregards the economic reality of wildlife trade and its broader socio-economic and cultural drivers (e.g., Challender et al., 2015; Challender and MacMillan, 2014; Cooney and Abensperg-Traun, 2013; Roe et al., 2002) . Controlling trade requires understanding markets, including supply (e.g., species abundance, production and trade volumes) and demand (e.g., consumer preferences, demand elasticity and social norms surrounding consumption) and how these forces interact (e.g., price and market structure), and crucially, how they can be influenced and respond to different interventions (e.g., http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2015.04.015 0006-3207/Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Here, we critically -and constructively -evaluate the CITES approach to controlling trade through means of a case study on the trade in pangolins (Pholidota: Manidae) in Asia, and suggest reforms that would enable the Convention to more effectively govern international wildlife trade. Specifically, we analyse CITES trade data and seizure data on pangolins in Asia and review actions taken within the Convention to control trade in Asian pangolins in order to evaluate the effectiveness of these actions. We then present analyses of price data and contemporary demand for pangolin products to demonstrate the utility of understanding markets to informing trade interventions which go beyond regulation of supply. We then suggest reforms that we argue would enable CITES to more effectively control international wildlife trade.
Case study background: pangolins in Asia
Pangolins are insectivorous mammals covered in epidermal scales. Four species occur in Asia, the Chinese (Manis pentadactyla), Sunda (Manis javanica), Indian (Manis crassicaudata), and Philippine pangolin (Manis culionensis), and which are collectively distributed from Pakistan east through southern China, and south throughout the Indian sub-continent and much of Southeast Asia (Kingdon et al., 2013; Challender et al., 2014a, b) . Historically, they have been exploited locally for a range of consumptive uses (e.g., as a protein source, a 'tonic' food, and an ingredient in traditional Asian medicine), most conspicuously in China (Wu et al., 2004; Wu and Ma, 2007) , but also for international trade ( Fig. 1 ; Herklots, 1937; Harrisson and Loh, 1965) . Understudied, they are also difficult to census, and with few exceptions (e.g., Wu et al., 2004) there is a lack of quantitative data on populations (e.g., Challender et al., 2014a, b) . However, it is understood that populations in China were commercially extinct by the mid-1990s, and which has since been dependent on imports, mainly from Southeast Asia ( Fig. 1 ; Wu et al., 2004; SATCM, 1996) . This has driven regional trade dynamics with international trade being substituted for local use in many areas (e.g., MacMillan and Nguyen, 2013; Newton et al., 2008; Pantel and Anak, 2010) , and evidence suggests populations are declining rapidly, and the species' are becoming increasingly rare as a result (Challender et al., 2014a, b) . Asian pangolins provide a useful case study with which to evaluate the CITES approach to controlling trade because of their long history of involvement with the Convention's regulatory processes. They have been included in Appendix II since 1975, they were included in the Review of Significant Trade (RST) process in 1988 (preliminary phase), 1992 (phase I) and 1999 (phase IV), and the Chinese and Sunda pangolins were also candidate species for the RST in 2004 (post-CoP13 phase). The RST is a desk-based species-specific non-compliance response mechanism through which remedial measures such as export quotas and field projects are formulated where CITES trade data suggests trade levels have been unsustainable (Reeve, 2002) . All Asian pangolins, with the exception of the Philippine species, which was recently described as distinct from the Sunda pangolin (see Gaubert and Antunes, 2005) and listed in Appendix II in 2007, were also subject to a proposed transfer from Appendix II to Appendix I at the 11th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP; 2000) . However, the Parties instead opted to establish zero export quotas for all wild-caught Asian pangolins traded commercially -in effect a proxy trade ban (CITES, 2000a) . Despite these measures, and the species being listed as protected in all but two range states today (Bhutan and Brunei Darussalam), some of which have implemented strong regulatory measures, most notably China (see Fig. 1 ), Asian pangolins are currently subject to on-going illicit international trade (Wu and Ma, 2007; Challender et al., 2014a Challender et al., , 2014b . It is understood this trade is typically destined to China and Vietnam, where pangolin meat is consumed as a luxury food and scales are prescribed in traditional medicines, and is now sourced from Southeast and South Asia, and increasingly from Africa ( Fig. 1 ; Challender, 2011; Challender and Hywood, 2012; Mahmood et al., 2012; Mohapatra et al., 2015) .
Methodology and data sources
To critically evaluate the CITES approach to controlling trade we used CITES trade data and seizure data on pangolins in Asia and charted actions taken for Asian pangolins in the Convention by reviewing CITES documentation. To gain an understanding of prices and demand for pangolin products in key consumer markets we conducted semi-structured interviews with traditional medicine retailers and wholesalers in China and Vietnam, and staff in restaurants known to serve pangolins in Vietnam. We augmented our price data with that available in the literature, and describe our methods in more detail below.
Trade data

CITES trade data
To determine trade levels, species and derivatives in trade, we downloaded data from the CITES trade database (UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre, Cambridge, UK) which is the primary source of data on international wildlife trade and contains data on imports, exports, and re-exports of CITES listed species as reported by Parties in their annual reports (UNEP-WCMC, 2013) . Data for all species of pangolin were downloaded in a comparative tabulation report in October 2013, and records of Asian pangolins and 'Manis spp.' in trade between 1975 and 2012, as reported by importers, were extracted for analyses (e.g., Carpenter et al., 2005) . Trade in skins (including length and skin pieces), scales (by weight), bodies, specimens and live animals only were analysed as they could unambiguously be equated to a number of individual animals (e.g., Nijman, 2010) . Records where origins/exporters were of African origin were excluded to avoid analysing reported trade in African pangolins. Although it is likely these data contain biases (e.g., under-reporting and lack of reporting), reflecting variation in reporting competency and compliance among CITES Parties historically, and while CITES trade data have been demonstrated to be unreliable (e.g., Blundell and Mascia, 2005) , there is no substitute source of data on international wildlife trade at the species level. We therefore used these data to estimate trade levels but acknowledge the likely biases they contain.
Seizure data
While pangolins in Asia are evidently traded illegally at the international level (Challender, 2011; Wu and Ma, 2007) , CITES does not record this trade centrally. Data from seizures involving pangolins in Asia (including derivative, species, and number of animals in trade) between July 2000 (when zero export quotas came into effect) and 2013 were therefore compiled in a MS Excel database and also used to estimate trade levels. Although these data also contain biases (see below) they provide the most comprehensive means of analysing illicit trade (e.g., Underwood et al., 2013; Rosen and Smith, 2010) and were collected in four main ways. First, requests for seizure data were made to all ASEAN-WEN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations-Wildlife Enforcement Network) member countries' Customs, Police and CITES focal points and China's CITES Management Authority, and were extracted from Peninsular Malaysia's Department of Wildlife and National Parks (Perhilitan) annual reports (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) , in Spring 2011. Second, data were provided by organisations working in Asia with an interest in wildlife trade, including but not limited to TRAFFIC (including seizures from TRAFFIC's Bulletin journal), Wildlife Alliance Cambodia, and ASEAN-WEN. Third, data from local, national and international media were obtained by means of a Google alert for the word 'pangolin' in English, established in 2009, and alerts in Chinese, Vietnamese, and Bahasa established in 2010. A Google alert regularly searches for news articles and web pages on the internet using keywords and emails links to articles to a designated email address. Finally, data were acquired from published and grey literature on wildlife trade in Asia, and where reputable records of trade were found during data collection (e.g., from court cases), they were included in our analyses.
To estimate trade volumes species-specific parameters were used (Table 1) . For CITES data this applied to records of scales and skins (length) only as other derivatives were assumed to represent actual numbers of animals in trade (following UNEP-WCMC, 2013). For seizure data and records of trade, trade was categorised as involving 'individual animals' (e.g., live or dead pangolins), 'scales', 'meat' (e.g., de-scaled animals), and/or 'other', and number of animals was taken from the original data source where present or was estimated based on reported weights (Table 1) . To avoid double counting seizures, each confiscation was identified as a unique seizure based on the number/weight of animals/derivatives seized, date (day, month, year), and location (country, region, locality). In compiling the database careful attention was paid in order not to duplicate seizures which were often reported in multiple sources, and on completion of the database duplicate seizures were removed where found. Where seizures involved more than one derivative they were treated as mutually exclusive and though this does not account for the bias of missing shipments in estimating illegal trade levels, it does provide an estimated upper limit of pangolins in illegal trade in Asia based purely on the seizures recorded in our database. Species in trade was recorded from the original data source where present, or was inferred from reported countries of origin, species distribution, and seizure location, though this necessitated recording trade as involving one of multiple species for some seizures (see Table 1 ).
Although our seizure data provide a means of analyses, inherent biases mean they should not be interpreted as temporal trade trends or absolute trade volumes (e.g., Milliken et al., 2012) . This is because they do not account for law enforcement effort or reporting effort, which are difficult to acquire on a regional scale (e.g., Burn et al., 2011; Underwood et al., 2013) .
History of CITES action on Asian pangolins
To chart actions taken within CITES to control trade in Asian pangolins we reviewed relevant CITES documents, which were either downloaded from the CITES website (www.cites.org) or obtained from the CITES Secretariat directly. They included proposals to amend the CITES Appendices (e.g., 2000b), decisions made at CoP meetings (e.g., 2000a), and Animals Committee meeting documents (e.g., species selected for the RST and detailed species reviews; e.g., Anon., 1992) . We also made note of illegal trade recorded within the RST process but not reported to CITES.
Demand and prices for pangolins
To gain an understanding of demand and prices for pangolins and their derivatives, semi-structured interviews were conducted with staff from restaurants (18) known to serve pangolins in Vinh and Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) in Vietnam, and from traditional medicine retailers in Guangzhou, China (67) and Hanoi and HCMC in Vietnam (48) in 2012 and/or 2013. Interview topics included price, price trends, availability, utilisation, and additionally in restaurants, consumer characteristics and the attributes of pangolins considered important to consumers. Price data were also collected from a systematic search of academic and grey literature on wildlife trade and from non-governmental organisations in Asia (see Section 3.1.2), and were sourced from market surveys or interviews originally. Due to the sensitive nature of the research, responses varied among interviewees in terms of depth and detail, and our analyses therefore focus on examination of price trends, assessment of the availability of pangolin products, and utilisation, and additionally in restaurants, the characterisation of consumers and the consumption setting and pangolin attributes considered important to consumers. All prices were converted to 2013 real prices to account for inflation using historical exchange rates from OANDA (www.oanda.com).
Results
Trade in pangolins in Asia
CITES trade data indicate that between 1977 and 2012 an estimated 576,303 Asian pangolins were in international trade. This mainly involved skins (90%; 521,490/576,303), most of which were traded for commercial purposes (93%; 486,987/521,490), and virtually all of which (99%; 514,284/521,490) occurred prior to, or in, the year 2000 (Fig. 2) (Fig. 2) .
However, evidence from the RST process indicates that much trade occurred in this period that was not reported to CITES, and that these figures do not reflect supply of pangolins products to international markets. For instance, at a minimum, tens of thousands of pangolins were illegally imported to China in the early 1990's, largely from Southeast Asia (also see Wu and Ma, 2007; Li and Li, 1998) . Similarly, up to 10t of scales were imported to Taiwan (P.R. China) annually between 1980 and 1985 and up to 13t of scales were imported to South Korea annually throughout the 1980s, in addition to 55t in 1993, while China also imported a minimum of 95t of scales between 1990 and 1995 from Southeast Asia (Broad et al., 1988; Anon., 1992; Anon. 1999a, b) , and trade in skins also went unrecorded (also see Nooren and Claridge, 2001) . On this evidence alone, unreported trade involved an estimated additional 88-163% (or 505,423-935,369 animals based on parameters in Table 1 ) of trade reported to CITES.
Since 2000, little trade has been reported to CITES which perhaps suggests that the introduction of zero quotas has led to its near cessation (Fig. 2) . However, seizure data and records of trade indicate that a substantial illegal trade has taken place since. Between July 2000 and 2013 there were at least 886 seizures involving pangolins in Asia, which including records of trade represents an estimated 227,278 animals in trade illegally, or 16,269 ± 11,191 animals (mean ± SD) annually (Fig. 2) . These data also indicate that trade comprised scales mainly (41% of trade; or an estimated 94,279 animals) as well as live and dead animals (31%; 71,302/227,278), and pangolin meat (26%; 59,525/227,278). (2000), the scales of the Indian pangolin are larger than those of Asian conspecifics suggesting they comprise a higher proportion of body mass (Heath, 1995) . g Calculated by subtracting f from e. h Trimmed mean (n = 20,857; see Pantel and Anak, 2010 In contrast, there were few skins (2%; 5,170/227,278) and other derivatives (<0.1%; 2/227,278) in trade. These data further show that this trade occurred across Asia and involved all four species of Asian pangolin as well as derivatives of African pangolins ( Fig. 2; Fig. 3 ). Moreover, they arguably represent the metaphorical 'tip of the iceberg' in terms of trade volumes as this trade is clandestine, and characteristically, it is suspected much of it goes undetected and/or unrecorded (e.g., Underwood et al., 2013; Stiles et al., 2013 ; also see Challender et al., 2014c) .
History of CITES action on Asian pangolins
In response to high volumes of international trade in Asian pangolins, the species have been involved in a number of CITES processes. On the basis that trade levels were potentially unsustainable in the 1980s (see Fig. 2 ) each species (excluding the Philippine pangolin) was included in the preliminary phase of the RST process in 1988 (Fig. 1 ). This comprised a detailed review of information on the biology, threats and international trade in each species. It concluded that populations were thought to have declined in many areas in Asia as a result of hunting, but the absence of population data meant it was not possible to determine the impact of trade on populations (see Broad et al., 1988) .
Similarly, and on the same basis, these species were selected for review in phase I of the RST in 1992,which saw the advent of time-bound remedial measures where trade levels were deemed detrimental to species' survival in the wild (Reeve, 2002) . These reviews documented high volumes of illegal, international trade in Asian pangolins (see Section 4.1) and reported hunting-driven population declines in many areas of the species' range. In response, a series of primary recommendations (to be implemented within 30 days) and secondary recommendations (to be implemented within 12 months) were made to a number of Parties, and which predominantly focused on strengthening trade controls (see Table 2 ).
Notwithstanding implementation of these recommendations (see CITES, 1999) , high volumes of international trade, mainly in skins, continued to occur throughout the 1990s (Fig. 2) and Asian pangolins were subsequently included in phase IV of the RST process in 1999 ( Fig. 1 ; see Anon 1999a, b) . These reviews again concluded that the species were subject to extremely heavy hunting pressure, in particular the Chinese and Sunda pangolins, which had caused major populations declines, and that illegal trade, much of which was destined for China, dwarfed trade reported to CITES (see Section 4.1; Anon. 1999a, b) . Further, they concluded that the high monetary value of pangolins, which was increasing in many places, was incentivising supply and that there were very high levels of international demand for pangolin meat and scales, particularly in China. Again, primarily regulatory focused recommendations were made, including further restricting supply until the population status of each species had been assessed and trade control measures had been developed and implemented (Table 2) . While still subject to phase IV of the RST, Asian pangolins were also subject to a proposed transfer from Appendix II to Appendix I at CoP11 (2000; see CITES, 2000b). Like the above reviews, the proposal documented high levels of legal and illegal trade, in particular involving the Chinese and Sunda pangolins but also the Indian species, and associated population declines. Equally, it acknowledged the extremely high financial incentives to collect pangolins in Asia and the very high international demand for pangolins products, both meat and scales, particularly in China, much of which was being met with illegal supply (see CITES, 2000b) . Although the CITES Secretariat acknowledged that the Sunda pangolin at least met the criteria for an Appendix I listing (see CITES, 2000c) , it considered the transfer of the species to Appendix I to be premature because phase IV of the RST process had not been completed, and the proposal was ultimately rejected by Parties. Instead, and despite the up-listing proposal outlining the reality of trade, both in terms of supply and demand, the Parties established zero export quotas for all wild-caught Asian pangolins traded for primarily commercial purposes -or in effect a proxy trade ban (CITES, 2000b) .
Although the purpose of these measures was to bring about greater control of trade, evidence from CITES trade data suggests that the Appendix I proposal catalysed trade initially, which would account for the peak in trade in 2000, based on the potential for a trade ban to have been established (e.g., Rivalan et al., 2007) , while seizure data demonstrate that despite zero export quotas, illegal trade has continued since (Fig. 2) . However, as this trade is not recorded by CITES it has not been acted upon with the Convention. For instance, although the Chinese and Sunda pangolins were candidate species for the post-CoP13 phase of the RST process in 2004, they were not selected for detailed review on the basis that reported trade levels were negligible. However, in reality these species were subject to high levels of seemingly unsustainable trade, albeit illegal, and therefore arguably in need of further trade intervention ( Figs. 2 and 3 ; CITES, 2004) . Following the establishment of zero quotas, it was not until 2010 (i.e. ten years later) that further action was taken to address this trade in the form of a 'CITES alert' which was sent by the CITES Secretariat to the Parties and drew attention to this trade. The issue was subsequently raised at CoP16 (2013; see Fig. 1 ), which resulted in a reporting mandate for range states in Asia to the 65th meeting of the CITES Standing Committee (July 2014). It also ultimately led to the current mandate for all Parties to submit information on pangolin trade and conservation to the 66th Standing Committee meeting (January 2016; see Fig. 1 ).
Demand and prices for pangolins
Semi-structured interviews in China and Vietnam revealed that pangolin products, both meat and scales, were readily available in these markets and provided insights into contemporary demand. In China, they revealed that scales were available from 69% (22/32) and 80% (28/35) of retailers in 2012 and 2013 respectively, and in Vietnam from 91% (21/23) in 2012 and 77% (37/48) in 2013, either in raw or fried form, or both. As reported nearly exclusively by retailers and wholesalers, scales are used in traditional medicines to improve blood circulation, cure skin diseases, and stimulate milk secretion in lactating women, as prescribed in official Chinese and Vietnamese pharmacopeia. Other medicinal uses were also reported, including use in medicines to help cure cancer, and non-medical applications such as the use of scales as guitar plectrums. Although obtaining accurate information on the volume of scales sold was problematic, based on the sensitivity of the research topic and pangolin scales being one of hundreds of ingredients stocked by traditional medicine retailers and wholesalers, their availability indicates that they remain in demand for medicinal purposes, as stated by interviewees. This is despite scales being associated with illegality in both Vietnam and China, but particularly the latter. In China, scales certified by government agencies (indicated by a sticker on the packaging) may be sold legally through designated hospitals (see Fig. 1 ), but uncertified scales were widely available from medicinal outlets, as our interview results demonstrate. Semi-structured interviews revealed that pangolins also continue to be in demand for their meat. In Vietnam, meat was available in all 18 restaurants frequented, and which were high-end luxury restaurants characterised by private dining rooms fitted out with flat-screen televisions and which promoted luxury brands of whisky and other luxury entertainment venues (e.g., nightclubs). Interviewees reported that pangolins are in demand for their meat because the animals are considered to be rare and are wild-caught, because they retail at high prices (pangolin was the most expensive meat in 16/18 restaurants frequented), and illegality associated with procurement means they perform an important social function of imparting status among consumers. Consumers are characteristically business elites (e.g., bankers) and/or state officials keen to 'look after clients' when signing business contracts or very wealthy consumers keen to 'try something new'. The lead author of this article observed the consumption of a Sunda pangolin in a restaurant in HCMC, whereby the animal was brought into the restaurant alive and killed for consumption in front of the consumers. These were three middle-aged Vietnamese men (40-55 years old), who paid USD700 (USD340 kg À1 ) for the 2 kg animal, and who were trying it for the first time based on a friend's recommendation.
Available data indicate the retail price of pangolin products is also increasing. In China, the price of scales has increased from USD 76.15 kg À1 in 2000 to USD 759.15 kg À1 in 2013 ( Fig. 4a ; also see Wu and Ma, 2007) , and though fewer data are available over time, in Vietnam from USD 200.64 kg À1 in 2008 (n = 48) to USD 484.91 kg À1 in 2013 (n = 62). The price of meat has also been increasing, from USD 46.92 to USD 297.12 kg À1 between 2000 and 2012 in China (Fig. 4b) , and from USD 163.39 (n = 11) to 304.64 kg À1 (n = 10) between 2007 and 2012 in Vietnam. These price rises can be attributed to growing demand in these markets following fast-paced growth in recent decades and the development of luxury, urban markets, especially for wild meat (e.g., Drury, 2011; Wu and Ma, 2007; Zhang and Yin, 2014) . However, they can also be attributed to the impact of regulation, meaning there is a higher risk to retailers/wholesalers from selling scales specifically, as stated by interviewees in China and Vietnam, as well as declining supply, i.e., fewer pangolins, which was also asserted by interviewees in both countries, and whom reported pangolins and their scales are now rare and hard to source. 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2007 2008 2010 2011 2012 Price kg -1 of meat/animal USD, 2013 real price Time Fig. 4b . Mean retail price of pangolin meat/animal kg À1 in China between 1991 and 2012.
Discussion
Lessons learnt from the case study
Data on trade in pangolins in Asia indicates that CITES monitoring does not reflect supply to international markets and that illegal trade has undermined reporting to CITES both pre-and post-2000. This is despite the implementation of remedial measures formulated to control trade within the RST, and the establishment of zero quotas, which appear to have catalysed trade in the year 2000 and otherwise sent it underground since. This has implications for trade governance because it means that CITES now understands less about the dynamics of this trade than before zero export quotas were established. For instance, it possesses little data on trade levels, species or derivatives in trade, or countries of origin, export and destination, and therefore precludes any assessment of the sustainability of trade.
The impact of zero quotas, to send trade underground, occurred despite the requirement for Parties to consider the impact of trade controls on trade dynamics and species conservation (see Res. Conf. 9.24, Rev. CoP16). However, Parties are not required to assess the impacts in realistic terms. Proponents of amendments to the Appendices are only required to provide information on how the proposed changes will 'affect the nature of trade' (which the listing criteria interpret as the purpose and source of trade, and derivatives in trade, etc -see Res. Conf. 9.24, Rev. CoP16), but they are not explicitly required to consider other realistic outcomes. For example, will a listing in CITES simply send trade underground? Will it catalyse trade? Will it increase prices? Yet, this is impractical because it is known that proposed amendments and adopted changes to species' listings can adversely affect trade leading to negative conservation outcomes. For example, it is known that these decisions have served to increase prices and stimulate trade (e.g., Rivalan et al., 2007; Courchamp et al., 2006) , adversely affecting listed species (Leader-Williams, 2003; 't Sas-Rolfes, 2000) .
Although unrecorded and illegal trade arguably reflect compliance problems in terms of governance and enforcement capacity among CITES Parties (e.g., Reeve, 2002; Duckworth et al., 2012) , they are also indicative of substantial international demand for pangolin products. However, there is no explicit requirement to consider consumer demand for wildlife products in CITES decision-making (see Res. Conf. 9.24, Rev. CoP16) . Again this is unrealistic because it disregards the complex socio-cultural, consumer, and economic factors of demand (e.g., the social norms driving consumption, the social function of wildlife products, and price elasticity), but which can undermine trade controls, as evidenced by ongoing illegal trade in many species (e.g., Rosen and Smith, 2010; Biggs et al., 2013; Drury, 2011; Zhang and Yin, 2014) . As demonstrated in our case study, zero export quotas were established despite the proposal to transfer Asian pangolins to Appendix I explicitly recognising very high levels of international demand for pangolin meat and scales, particularly in China (see CITES, 2000b) . Within China, pangolin scales have been used in traditional medicines since at least the 16th century, a form of medicine used by hundreds of millions of people today (Cheung, 2011) and the proposal also recognised that since the mid-1990's China has reportedly been dependent on pangolin imports from elsewhere in Asia ( Fig. 1; CITES, 2000b; Wu and Ma, 2007) .
Understanding demand though can inform the appropriateness of, and likely impact of interventions. Our semi-structured interviews in China and Vietnam reveal that pangolins continue to be in demand today for their scales, despite being associated with illegality, and their meat, the attributes of which in procurement and consumption terms suggest that relying on trade controls will be inadequate to halt trade and additional interventions will be needed. Rarity, the fact that pangolin meat is wild, illegality, high price, and the significance of conspicuous consumption in East and Southeast Asian consumer markets, suggest that trade controls will be unlikely to influence demand and counter-intuitively, may even act to stimulate it (Wong and Ahuvia, 1998; Shairp, 2013) . More appropriate interventions therefore, could be social marketing and behaviour change programmes targeted at consumers and their social and professional networks directly, in order to change their preferences and purchasing behaviour and thereby reduce demand (Challender and MacMillan, 2014) . Additionally, for consumers of meat, interventions could take the form of business-to-business led social responsibility commitments to reduce demand for pangolin meat in restaurants, the specifics of which could be informed and honed through further research.
Although quantifying demand is difficult, understanding markets (e.g., market conditions and price trends) could be used to identify circumstances where additional interventions may be needed. For example where demand appears to be increasing and/or supply declining, as our case study demonstrates. While pangolins have been consumed locally through history in Asia for their scales and meat, demand in China and Vietnam appears to be increasing driven by rising levels of wealth, which has catalysed luxury urban demand today, especially for meat, and led to rising prices (Fig. 4; Wu and Ma, 2007; Drury, 2011 ; also see Hall et al., 2008; Courchamp et al., 2006) . These data also suggest that supply is declining, which is supported indirectly by traditional medicine retailers and wholesalers whom reported that pangolins are hard to source, and by the understanding that pangolin populations in Asia have been declining rapidly in recent decades, driven by international trade (e.g., Challender et al., 2014a, b) . As populations in China have been depleted ( Fig. 1 ; Wu et al., 2004 ) the source of pangolins has shifted to Southeast Asia (Newton et al., 2008; Anon., 1999a) and South Asia (e.g., Mahmood et al., 2012) , and facilitated by increasing economic ties with African nations, to Africa as well (Challender and Hywood, 2012) . However, CITES lacks a responsive mechanism through which to consider and act on these market dynamics. For instance, price data are not recorded in CITES. Although rising prices for pangolin products and suspected population declines were recorded in the RST process, this mechanism does not comprise an in-depth assessment of markets, and nor does it formulate interventions to address them, at least in demand terms. As Asian pangolins demonstrate, the remedial measures formulated for these species did nothing to address demand directly. However, these price trends are extremely worrying because where similar price increases have been observed for other rare species; they have been inversely correlated to population size (e.g., Courchamp et al., 2006 ; also see Hall et al., 2008) , and they suggest that while pangolins in Asia face an increasing threat of extinction, since the establishment of zero export quotas in 2000, this has largely gone unnoticed in CITES.
Reforms to CITES
CITES is the mechanism through which international trade in wildlife is regulated. Our case study demonstrates significant inadequacies to its current approach because it fails to accurately monitor supply, to consider the impact of trade controls in realistic terms or the complex nature of demand for wildlife, and it does not contend with changing market dynamics. Here we outline reforms which we assert would enable CITES to more effectively manage trade.
Notwithstanding the urgent need for concerted research and monitoring effort on the status and sustainable harvest of many CITES listed species Phelps et al., 2011; Challender et al., 2015) , supply, and the threat trade poses to many listed species could be better understood by formally monitoring illegal trade. Within CITES this could comprise the verification and submission of data (e.g., from seizures and prosecutions) by Parties to CITES centrally. CITES currently receives illegal trade data through biennial reporting, and already has provisions to record illegal trade in its trade database under the source code 'I', to which some countries (e.g., the US) currently reports seizures, and to which illegal trade data could be reported by all Parties. Alternatively, CITES already records illegal trade, at least for elephants, in the form of ETIS (the Elephant Trade Information System), to which Parties also submit data (see Milliken et al., 2012) , and which could potentially be expanded to incorporate illegal trade more generally.
While an illegal trade database within CITES has previously been discussed, the idea has been dismissed due to concerns about the Secretariat's management capacity and duplication of effort with other organisations (e.g., Interpol; see CITES, 2012). However, lack of a mechanism or mandate to record this trade centrally in CITES and ensure it informs decision-making, remains the elephant in the room in CITES terms. This is because many species are traded illegally (e.g., Rosen and Smith, 2010; Phelps et al., 2011) but such trade typically goes unrecorded. Although seizure data typically represent only a fraction of illegal trade, these volumes can be substantial as our case study demonstrates (also see Underwood et al., 2013) . Formal reporting would allow robust analyses and ensure that these data, which would realistically comprise the best available evidence on illegal trade, could contribute to decision-making (e.g., Milliken et al., 2012) . It would also likely mean that data would be of higher quality than that currently used to understand illegal trade (e.g., seizures reported in the press), and would arguably bring about a better understanding of illicit trade dynamics with which to inform interventions. Currently, this only happens for elephants, and though Parties are requested to report periodically on selected species traded illegally through special reporting requirements (see CITES, 2014b), these comprise only a fraction of those CITES listed species in illegal trade. Moreover, these reporting processes are fragmented, are often difficult for Parties to keep abreast of, and poor reporting rates undermine any contribution these data could make to decision-making (e.g., CITES, 2014b). A step change to reporting all illegal trade could potentially alleviate these problems and simultaneously improve the evidence base for decision-making.
Monitoring of demand and retail prices for listed species would also allow CITES to gain an understanding of demand and market dynamics. This could be used to indicate instances where additional measures are necessary (e.g., programmes to reduce demand for illegal products where it is increasing), and inform the nature of the interventions themselves. Although quantifying demand is difficult, monitoring could take the form of national, annual wildlife consumption surveys to capture trends in the consumption of internationally-sourced CITES listed species. This could include a quantitative element to collect data on sales volumes, the number of retail outlets selling given species and derivatives, as well as consumer characteristics and price data. It could also include a qualitative, inductive element to capture current and emerging demand factors (e.g., social norms surrounding consumption) and emerging markets and products, such as new markets pushed for rhino horn in recent years (see Biggs et al., 2013) . Where trade is illegal, other appropriate methodologies could also be used to collect sensitive data (such as indirect questioning; e.g., St. John et al., 2010) . This monitoring could be conducted by Parties' within a standard format to be reported to CITES centrally through their national agencies, and in conjunction with other industry bodies where appropriate (e.g., trade, commerce or traditional medicine agencies) to ensure robust reporting.
All these data (illegal trade, demand and prices) could be maintained in a central database managed by a new 'CITES Economic Bureau', and be integrated with the existing CITES trade database. This would allow the impact of trade controls to be evaluated, both before and after implementation, and the application of interventions which go beyond regulation. For instance, mandating Parties to consider the impact that proposed amendments to the Appendices would likely have on consumer demand and prices, as well as supply (e.g., through Revisions to Res. Conf. 9.24, Rev. CoP16), would enable a more realistic assessment of the proposed amendment to bringing trade under control. Where proposed amendments were adjudged to be inadequate (e.g., where trade is illegal or would likely go underground, where demand is characterised by being inelastic, is culturally embedded, or data suggest demand is growing; e.g., Biggs et al., 2013) , additional interventions which address demand directly could be implemented simultaneously. These could include targeted social marketing and behaviour change programmes to change consumer preferences and reduce demand (Challender and MacMillan, 2014) , approaches that have arguably proven more effective historically at influencing demand and bringing about control of wildlife trade than purely regulatory measures (e.g., Stiles, 2004; Phillip et al., 2009; Roe et al., 2002) . The CITES Economic Bureau could also provide objective expertise on decision-making in economic terms, either like the CITES Secretariat currently provides for proposed amendments to the Appendices, or like the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) expert panel does for commercially exploited aquatic organisms. However, these data should not be limited to informing proposals to amend the Appendices. Annual analyses of all trade (legal and illegal, prices, and consumption trends) by the CITES Economic Bureau would provide an on-going and up to date mechanism with which to evaluate the efficacy of all CITES interventions. For instance, where legal/illegal trade data, consumption trends and/or price data suggest that demand for a given species or product is rapidly increasing and could be unsustainable, it could inform the implementation of initial or modified demand management interventions.
To implement these changes, a number of issues would need to be addressed. These include a reluctance among Parties' to cede further sovereignty by committing to reporting illegal trade; potentially low reporting rates of illegal trade for similar reasons; funding to implement demand and price monitoring and the associated reporting by Parties (which would be substantial), and capacity among developing world Parties. How these changes would be brought about (e.g., by Resolution or amendments to the Convention text) would also need to be considered, as would the agencies responsible for management and implementation of the likely diverse and multi-faceted demand management measures. However, funding for the proposed CITES Economic Bureau and the required monitoring activities to be carried out by the Parties', at least in the developing world, could potentially come from new financing sources currently being explored by CITES (e.g., Global Environmental Facility (GEF) funding), and the Economic Bureau could work with Parties collaboratively, as well as designated national agencies, including but not limited to Management and Scientific Authorities (e.g., local marketing experts) to implement these demand focused measures.
Without a mechanism to record illegal trade, to understand markets and address demand, and evaluate the impact of trade controls, as our case study demonstrates, listed species will continue to be subject to illicit and potentially detrimental trade, despite receiving protection within CITES. In a world characterised by rapid economic and social change, understanding and maintaining information concerning highly dynamic markets, evaluating the impact of interventions, and implementing measures which influence demand as well as supply is now essential to conserving the world's trade-threatened species.
